We show that the Aumann-Davis-Maschler bargaining set and the Mas-Colell bargaining set of a non-leveled NTU game that is either ordinal convex or coalition merge convex coincides with the core of the game. Moreover, we show by means of an example that the foregoing statement may not be valid if the NTU game is marginal convex.
Introduction
Convex TU games were introduced by Shapley (1971) who discussed their basic properties and applications. One distinguished property of the family of convex games is that many of the leading solutions of TU games coincide on it. For example, Shapley has already proved in his aforementioned paper that the (non empty) core of a convex game coincides with its (unique) von Neumann Morgenstern solution. Clearly, this result makes the core look more intuitive. Also Shapley showed, in the same paper, that the Shapley value of a convex game is a member of its core, which makes the value look more intuitive.
A second step was taken by Maschler, Peleg, and Shapley (1972) who proved that the kernel of a convex TU game coincides with its nucleolus and the core coincides with its (AumannDavis-Maschler) bargaining set. Clearly these results enforce the intuitive meaning of both the core and the bargaining set. (Indeed, Maschler (1976) claims that for some games the AumannDavis-Maschler bargaining set has an advantage over the core.) This paper is the starting point of our investigation: We inquire whether the core and various bargaining sets coincide for convex NTU games.
Ordinal convexity for NTU games was introduced by Vilkov (1977) who generalized some of Shapley's (1971) results (under restrictive conditions). Peleg (1986) proved that the core of an ordinal convex NTU game coincides with the von Neumann Morgenstern solution. In this paper we investigate the bargaining set and the Mas-Colell bargaining set of ordinal convex and coalition merge convex NTU games (see Sections 2 and 4 for the terminology), and prove their coincidence with the core (under the assumption of non-levelness).
Preliminaries
Let N be a finite nonempty set. For S ⊆ N we denote by R S the set of all real functions on S. If x, y ∈ R S , then we write x y if x i y i for all i ∈ S. Moreover, we write x > y if x y and x = y and we write x y if x i > y i for all i ∈ S. Denote R S + = {x ∈ R S | x 0}. A set C ⊆ R S is comprehensive if x ∈ C, y ∈ R S , and y x imply that y ∈ C. An NTU game with the player set N is a pair (N, V ) where V is a function which associates with every coalition S (that is, S ⊆ N and
Moreover, we assume that V (∅) = ∅.
Let (N, V ) be an NTU game. Abbreviating "boundary" by "∂" we have
i.e., ∂V (N ) is the set of weakly Pareto optimal elements of V (N ). Note that for any ∅ = S ⊆ N , x ∈ R S is Pareto optimal in V (S) if x ∈ V (S) and if y ∈ V (S) and y x imply x = y. Note that, if (N, V ) is non-leveled, i.e., for all ∅ = S ⊆ N and all x, y ∈ ∂V (S), x y implies x = y, then ∂V (S) is the set of Pareto optimal elements in V (S).
In order to recall the definitions of the unconstrained (Aumann-Davis-Maschler) bargaining set (Aumann and Maschler 1964, Davis and Maschler 1967) and of the Mas-Colell prebargaining set (Mas-Colell 1989) , let x ∈ R N . A pair (P, y) is an objection at x if ∅ = P ⊆ N , y is Pareto optimal in V (P ), and y > x P . An objection (P, y) is strong if y x P . The pair (Q, z) is a weak counter objection to the objection (P, y) if Q ⊆ N , Q = ∅, P , if z ∈ V (Q), and if z (y P ∩Q , x Q\P ). A weak counter objection (Q, z) is a counter objection to the objection (P, y) if z > (y P ∩Q , x Q\P ). A strong objection (P, y) is justified in the sense of the bargaining set if there exist players k ∈ P and ∈ N \ P such that there does not exist any weak counter objection (Q, z) to (P, y) satisfying ∈ Q and k / ∈ Q. The unconstrained bargaining set of (N, V ), PM(N, V ), is the set of all x ∈ ∂V (N ) that do not have strong justified objections at x in the sense of the bargaining set (Davis and Maschler 1967 ). An objection (P, y) is justified in the sense of the Mas-Colell bargaining set if there does not exist any counter objection to (P, y). The Mas-Colell prebargaining set of (N, V ), PMB(N, V ), is the set of all x ∈ ∂V (N ) that do not have a justified objection at x in the sense of the Mas-Colell bargaining set (Mas-Colell 1989) .
Note that the bargaining set, M(N, V ), is defined by M(N, V ) = PM(N, V ) ∩ I(N, V ) and the Mas-Colell bargaining set, MB(N, V ), is defined by MB(N, V ) = PMB(N, V ) ∩ I(N, V ), where I(N, V ) = {x ∈ ∂V | x i max V ({i}) for all i ∈ N }, i.e., I(N, V ) is the set of imputations.
Recall that (N, V ) is
Note that an ordinal convex game is, hence, superadditive.
The excess NTU game
For an NTU game (N, V ) and x ∈ R N we define the excess game (N, V x ) by the requirement that, for any ∅ = S ⊆ N ,
Note that with V x (∅) = ∅ the pair (N, V x ) is an NTU game (i.e., (1) and (2) are valid).
Lemma 3.1 Let (N, V ) be an NTU game and x ∈ V (N ). Then x ∈ C(N, V ) if and only if 0 ∈ C(N, V x ).
R) and y S\R 0. Hence, there exists i ∈ R such that x i y i + x i and we conclude that 0 ∈ C(N, V x ). Conversely, if 0 ∈ C(N, V x ), then, for any coalition T and any y ∈ V (T ), y x T implies y − x T ∈ V x (T ) so that there exists j ∈ T with y j − x j 0. Thus, x ∈ C(N, V ).
q.e.d.
We may now prove the main result of this section.
Proof: One direction is a direction of Lemma 3.1 (2). For the remaining direction, letx ∈ C(N, V x ) and assume, on the contrary, that x / ∈ C(N, V ). Let P = {i ∈ N |x i > 0}. As V x ({i}) ⊇ −R + for all i ∈ N ,x 0 and by the relevant direction of (2) of Lemma 3.1, P = ∅. Asx ∈ V x (N ), there exists P ⊆ S ⊆ N such thatx S + x S ∈ V (S). Hence, (P,x P + x P ) is an objection to x in the sense of the Mas-Colell bargaining set. Let (Q, y) be a counterobjection to (P,x P + x P ) then y > (x P ∩Q + x P ∩Q , x Q\P ). By non-levelness there exists y ∈ V (Q) such that y (x P ∩Q + x P ∩Q , x Q\P ). Asx Q\P = 0, y − x Q ∈ V x (Q) and y − x Q x Q which is impossible becausex ∈ C(N, V x ).
The following corollary may be regarded as a generalization of Solymosi's (1999) main result for TU games. 
Results and examples
In order to apply the results of Section 3 to ordinal convex NTU games, the following lemma is needed.
Lemma 4.1 If (N, V ) is an ordinal convex NTU game, then (N, V x ) is ordinal convex.
Proof: Let ∅ = S, T ⊆ N and let y ∈ R N satisfy y S ∈ V x (S) and y T ∈ V x (T ). We have to show that y S∩T ∈ V x (S ∩ T ) or y S∪T ∈ V x (S ∪ T ). If y S 0 ∈ R S or y T 0 ∈ R T , then y S∪T ∈ V x (S ∪ T ). Hence, we may assume that neither y S 0 nor y T 0. Then there exist
The core of an ordinal convex game is nonempty (Greenberg 1985) . Moreover, an ordinal convex game is superadditive. Thus, Theorem 3.2, Lemma 3.1, and Corollary 3.3 have the following consequence.
Corollary 4.2 The unconstrained bargaining set and the Mas-Colell prebargaining set of any ordinal convex non-leveled NTU game coincide with its core.
The following example shows that "non-levelness" is needed in the statement concerning the bargaining set of Corollary 4.2. Let |N | 3 and, for any S ⊆ N ,
where χ S ∈ R N is the characteristic vector of S, i.e., χ S i = 1 for i ∈ S and χ S j = 0 for j ∈ N \ S. Then (N, V ) is ordinal convex. Let k ∈ N and x = −χ N \{k} . Then x / ∈ C(N, V ). Note that k has no objection against any other player and any objection of any i ∈ N \ {k} is of the form (S, y) such that S = N \ {k}, 0 y x N \{k} , so that (N \ {i}, 0) is a counterobjection. As x is individually rational, x ∈ M(N, V ).
By means of an example that is derived from the voting game of the Voting Paradox (Holzman, Peleg, and Sudhölter 2007, Sect. 3) we now show that nonlevelness is also crucial for the statement concerning the Mas-Colell bargaining set.
Example 4.3 Let N = {1, 2, 3} and (N, V ) the 0-normalized game defined by
, and V (N ) = {(2, 2, 0), (2, 0, 2), (0, 2, 2), (2, 1, 1), (1, 2, 1), (1, 1, 2)} − R N + .
For any ∅ = S, T ⊆ N and any x ∈ R N such that x S ∈ V (S) and x T ∈ V (T ) we have x S∪T ∈ V (S ∪ T ). Indeed, in order to verify this fact we may assume that
, say x i 0, then x j 2 for all j ∈ N implies x ∈ V (N ). Finally, if x 0, then |S| = |T | = 2 and x (2, 1, 1) or x (1, 2, 1) or x (1, 1, 2). Hence, (N, V ) is ordinal convex. Let y = (1, 1, 0). Then y is weakly Pareto optimal. Assume that y has a justified weak objection (P, z). Then z is Pareto optimal in V (P ). If P = N and z = (2, 2, 0), z = (2, 0, 2), or z = (0, 2, 2), then (P, z) can be countered by ({2, 3}, (2, 1)), ({1, 2}, (2, 1)), or ({1, 3}, (1, 2)), respectively. If z = (2, 1, 1), z = (1, 1, 2), or z = (1, 2, 1), then (P, z) can also be countered by the aforementioned pairs, respectively. If P = {1, 2}, then z = (2, 1) so that ({2, 3}, (2, 1)) is a counterobjection. If P = {2, 3}, then z = (2, 1) so that ({1, 3}, (1, 2)) is a counterobjection. Finally, if P = {1, 3}, then either z = (2, 0) so that ({2, 3}, (2, 1)) is a counterobjection or z = (1, 2) so that ({1, 2}, (2, 1)) is a counterobjection. Hence y ∈ MB(N, V ). Moreover, (2, 1) ∈ V ({2, 3}). Thus MB(N, V ) \ C(N, V ) = ∅. Also, (2, 2, 0) ∈ C(N, V ) has the justified objection ({2, 3}, (2, 1)) so that C(N, V ) \ MB(N, V ) = ∅.
For |N | = 2 the bargaining set M coincides with and the Mas-Colell prebargaining set PMB is contained in the core, provided that the core is nonempty. If (N, V ) is defined by V (S) = −R S for all S ⊆ N , then C(N, V ) = {0} and 0 is the unique individually rational feasible payoff vector so that the bargaining sets coincide with the core. However, any x ∈ R N satisfying x 0, but x 0 (i.e., x i = 0 for some i ∈ N ) belongs to PM(N, V ). However, PMB(N, V ) = C(N, V ).
For any finite nonempty set N let Π(N ) denote the set of orderings of N , i.e., Π(N ) = {π : N → {1, . . . , |N |} | π is bijective}.
Moreover, for i ∈ N and π ∈ Π(N ), denote P π i = {j ∈ N | π(j) < π(i)} and define, recursively, x V,π i ∈ R ∪ {−∞}, i = π −1 (1), . . . , π −1 (|N |), by 
